Regulatory compliance is often promoted via unannounced inspections where firms found to be in violation of environmental, health, or safety regulations face punishments. When compliance is costly to firms, a key aspect of this approach is that the timing of inspections is unannounced and difficult to anticipate, lest firms comply only when they believe an inspection is likely. With data from Los Angeles (LA) County food-service health inspections, I estimate how the (in)ability to anticipate inspection timing affects compliance using a novel approach. Many facilities such as hotels, grocery stores, or food courts, consist of multiple food-service establishments sharing a single physical location. Multiple establishments within a single facility are commonly, though not always, inspected on the same day, meaning all but one of the establishments involved likely anticipate the timing of their next inspection to a considerable extent. Within such facilities, I show that establishments perform significantly worse on days in which they receive the sole inspection conducted at their facility. These "surprise" inspections detect 7.75% more violations, 9.1% more inspection score point deductions, and 16.3% more major critical violations (the most severe violations of the county health code).
Introduction
Enforcement of environmental, health, and safety regulations often involves periodic unannounced inspections of firms, during which, detected violations incur punishments. Inspection regimes promote compliance by establishing, at all times, an expected cost for committing violations: the cost incurred if the violation is detected multiplied by the probability of inspection and subsequent detection. However, if firms can anticipate the timing of inspections to some extent (i.e., correctly predict when their inspection probability is low), much of this expected cost may be mitigated.
Regulatory agencies face a tradeoff: limiting firms' abilities to anticipate inspection timing (e.g., by increasing inspection frequency) should improve compliance, but is costly. This makes it important to understand how, and to what extent, the ability to anticipate inspection timing affects compliance.
Accounting for firms' abilities to anticipate inspection timing severely complicates empirical assessment of this relationship. The most closely related existing studies employ a two-step approach. First, inspection probabilities for different time periods are estimated using firm observables. Then, compliance measures are estimated as a function of the probability predictions, which proxy for firms' expected inspection probabilities.
1 Alternatively, I exploit a feature of Los Angeles (LA) County food-service health inspections that provides sharp within-firm variation in the ability to anticipate inspection timing. These results add to a relatively small body of evidence regarding regulatory compliance and the surprise nature of inspections. To my knowledge they are the first such results that, rather than proxying for firm beliefs with inspection probability estimates, utilize two different inspection states across which ability to anticipate inspection timing varies considerably within firms. Finally, they highlight a dilemma likely faced by many authorities regulating food-service hygiene. Facilities housing multiple food-service establishments are very common, and it's less costly to inspect these establishments by sending an inspector to the location once. Are the additional costs of inspecting separate establishments during separate visits outweighed by the potential public health benefits? 3 My results enable evaluation of this tradeoff, and follow a methodology by which regulatory bodies across the industry can make similar assessments.
Los Angeles County Food-Service Health Inspections
The LA County DPH inspects all restaurants and retail food markets in unincorporated areas, and 85 of the 88 municipalities in the county. 4 Establishments are categorized as low, moderate, or high risk, based on the nature of the food served. 5 Establishments are inspected 1 to 3 times annually, and inspection frequency is higher for establishments in higher risk categories.
Establishments receive inspection scores beginning at 100, and points are deducted for health code violations. Violations are classified as critical or non-critical. Non-critical violations carry 1-point deductions. Critical violations are further classified as minor or major, carrying 2-point and 4-point penalties respectively. 6 The scoring criteria were revised beginning January 1, 2017. Three major critical violations now carry 11 rather than 4-point deductions. Also, committing two or more of the other major critical violations incurs an additional 3-point deduction.
7 In estimation, I account for the possible effects of these changes on compliance.
Detected violations are costly to establishments, in part, due to a disclosure program.
Excluding seven municipalities, establishments are required to display letter-grade placards for their most recent inspection score in their window. 
Methodology
To estimate how the ability to anticipate inspection timing affects compliance, I compare establishment performance across two inspection states: days where they received their facility's sole inspection, and days where they received one of multiple inspections at their facility. Using all 190,163 inspections, Figure 1 compares scores across both inspection states, revealing that establishments perform much better in the latter. 10 However, these simple comparisons pose a problem: at single-establishment facilities, establishments always receive their facility's sole inspection, and the choice to locate at multiple-establishment facilities may correlate with unobservable features that affect compliance.
To remove this potential source of bias, I focus on multiple-establishment facilities only.
9 These entries are empty for 100-point scores.
10 All scores are measured under the pre-2017 scoring criteria. Scores from 2017 and 2018 were adjusted when appropriate.
Estimating equations take the form
where Y i,j,t is an inspection outcome (e.g., total violations). Sole i,j,t equals 1 if, on date t, establishment i receives the sole inspection at facility j, and equals 0 otherwise.
I restrict my estimation sample to the 1,913 establishments with at least one inspection where Sole i,j,t = 1, and at least one inspection where Sole i,j,t = 0, and include establishment fixed effects. This compares the performance of establishments when Sole i,j,t = 1 against their own performance when Sole i,j,t = 0. Estimates of α 1 provide a lower bound on, e.g., average violations per inspection that go undetected when ability to anticipate inspection is elevated. It is a lower bound because, even on days when multiple establishments at a facility are inspected, the first establishment inspected lacks an elevated ability to anticipate inspection timing.
11
5 Results Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1) This simple specification is applied to four inspection outcomes: total violations, total critical violations, total major critical violations, and deducted points.
12 Table 2 presents estimates with additional controls for the inspection's day of the week, month, and year. 13 Under both specifications, receiving a facility's sole inspection leads to significant and substantial increases in all outcomes. Within this sample, when receiving one of multiple inspections
11 On a single day, the ordering of inspections within a facility is unknown. 12 For consistency, scores are measured under the county's original criteria across the entire sample period. 13 Inspector fixed effects are nearly perfectly colinear with establishment fixed effects, and thus, excluded.
at their facility, establishments average: 3.5941 violations, 0.7614 critical violations, 0.1715 major violations, and 4.6985 deducted points. Relative to those averages, full-specification estimates suggest that reduced ability to anticipate inspection timing leads to detection of:
7.75% more violations, 12.24% more critical violations, 16.27% more major critical violations, and 9.10% more point deductions.
Recall that establishments are assigned to three risk categories based on the type of food served (not inspection histories), and establishments in higher risk categories are inspected at higher frequencies.
14 Of the 1,402 facilities in the estimation sample, 962 house establishments in at least two different risk categories. Thus, most of the variation in Sole is likely driven by the need to inspect different risk-level establishments at different frequencies. However, it could be problematic if Sole i,j,t is influenced by an establishment's recent inspection history. For instance, if sole inspections tend to follow worse-than-usual inspections,α 1 might partly reflect establishments' persistent declines in hygiene quality. Table   3 alleviates these concerns, showing that my results are robust to including establishments' lagged deducted points as a regressor.
Conclusion
This paper shows that regulatory compliance is quite sensitive to the ability to anticipate inspection timing. Establishments that are often able to anticipate inspection timing are found to be significantly less compliant when that ability is occasionally removed. If establishments desire the inspection outcomes they receive when able to anticipate inspection timing, then permanent removal of this ability would cause compliance improvements.
This demonstrates a dilemma likely faced by many regulatory bodies: conducting same-day inspections of establishments at a shared facility is less costly, but reduces compliance among these establishments. In LA County, this reduced compliance includes the commission of significantly more major critical violations, suggesting potential public health benefits that 14 Risk category is time-invariant and absorbed in the establishment fixed effects. OLS estimates. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered two-way at the facility and inspector levels. †Points deducted from scores measured by pre-2017 scoring criteria.
